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In Fragment 19 of the Harvard Manuscripts, Saussure claims that difference, since it 
admits degrees, is an uncomfortable term. If anatomy as destiny (Freud, 1912, 1924) 
is more nuanced than one would like, since it also admits degrees, and anatomical 
difference does not mitigate the ultimate impossibility of conjugation between 
speaking beings (Lacan, 1991), how to think of the transit/translation between bodies 
and where to situate the differences that belong to them? In order to propose an 
answer, this paper starts from this hypothesis that it is advisable to develop this 
reflection about sexual difference a couple of feet above the waistline, foregrounding 
another organ (the tongue), what allows us to critically rethink the entanglement 
between gender and anatomy in psychoanalysis, in favor of the notion of style. 
 
 
Style is language clearly understood; 
punctuation is style clearly understood. 
George Sand (1871/1873, p. 91) 
 
Introduction 
According to etymologists, the Low-Latin word anatomia (anatomy) has traveled 
through history from the Greek ἀνατομή (anatomḗ), “dissection”, its corresponding 
verbal form ἀνατέμνω (anatémnō) meaning the act of “cutting into pieces”. From this 
starting point, in several modern languages the term would come to denominate i) the 
art of dissecting but also ii) the dissected body (the piece of anatomy); iii) the science 
dedicated to the study and morphology of living, especially human, beings; iv) and 
also, in a so-called “figurative” sense, “by extension”, any kind of methodical 
investigation (Serça, 2015, pp.173–184). Thus, along its polysemic transit, anatomy 
is: i) a practice of difference within the body; ii) the result, within the body, of a 
practice of difference; iii) a body of practices with difference; iv) and an exercise in 
recognizing the difference that was first distinguished in a practice with the body, 
regarded as something susceptible to fragmentation, precisely in the interstices where 
difference sprouts up. However, not all is a bed of roses… 
 
In the Fragment 19 of the Harvard Manuscripts, we shall witness Saussure forgoing 
any peace of mind by affirming that the difference, much desired as a sound 
guarantee, consists in a “uncomfortable term”, once it “allows for degrees” (Parret, 
1995-1996, p. 92). And now, what is to be done? After all, in the field of language, 
resemblance and difference are tangled up with each other, their nuances mixed up. 
 
1	Correspondence	concerning	this	article	should	be	addressed	to	Dr.	Paulo	Sérgio	de	 Souza	 Jr.,	 Outrarte,	 State	 University	 of	 Campinas	 (SP),	 Brazil.	 E-mail:	contra_sujeito@yahoo.com.br	




And there is no escaping the fact, which is known to be anxiogenic, that, even though 
acknowledging the possibility of distinction may seem inevitable, it is also difficult to 
understand structurally speaking, which elements should be distinguished and in 
which terms. However, if anatomy as a term (both word or end) seems to have more 
shades than we would like them to2, neither is it possible to categorically deny the 
suspicion that the differences perceived on the body (its sections) are, first of all, 
designated by the names they receive. These names, once put forth by a subject and 
accepted by a few others (Ambra, 2018, pp. 69–70), will in practice mark the first 
limits of their territory, and thereby determine both what will be inscribed in a certain 
way and what, in turn, will remain on the sidelines. The verb diferir, which in 
Portuguese means not only “to differ” but also “to defer” and, at the same time, “to 
extend”, bears witness to this. If these antithetical meanings of a not-at-all-primitive 
word bring a timeless problem back, it does so because differences, loaded with 
meaning and producing an anatomized body, establish dynamic and disproportionate 
limits not only within the body, but mainly within the commerce between bodies. And 
bodies are haunted by a mythical search in the other for complementarity, for 
something they cannot find within themselves: we should recall that the myth of the 
emergence of sexes narrated by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium tells that a 
sectioned body is, by all means, a sexed body. That said, how should we regard the 
traffic (the multiple attempts of access, the intercourses) between theses 
sectioned/sexed bodies which, to top it all, speak? 
 
To attempt an answer to this question, I start from the hypothesis that it is appropriate 
to take this reflection about sexual difference to a place situated a couple of feet above 
the waistline, bringing up another organ, the only exposed internal organ of the 
human body. Thus, let us speak about a viscus3 which, not by chance, short-circuits 
the inner and outer parts of the organism it inhabits, becoming, in many languages, 
perhaps the most renowned as well as the most mundane of the catachreses, getting 
away unnoticed as such: the tongue. 
 
From the Greek κατάχρησις (katákhrēsis), catachresis used to mean, within the 
context of rhetoric and figures of speech, using an expression regarded as 
inappropriate. In Latin, the word was abusio, an “ab-use”, a deviant use that, in an act 
of naming, would arise in order to make up for the inexistence of a specific word. 
Therefore, it would be possible to identify which named thing had come before and, 
later on, lent its acoustic image to the one that followed. And thus, it is also assumed 
that, as for the term tongue, we would be equally capable of pinpointing which organ 
had been named first: the φύσις (phýsis) organ, internal, so to speak (piece of flesh 
stretched along the vocal tract and with which a particular species, ours, had the 
privilege to set itself up to speak), or the νόμος (nómos) organ, which stems from the 
use, the habit, and within which the function of speech is confirmed and conformed: 
the “formative organ of thought”, according to W. von Humboldt (1836, p. 50). 
However, regarding the tongue, it remains to be seen whether this timeline is possible. 
 
2	After	all,	it	also	allows	for	its	degrees.	For	example,	the	spectrum	of	cases	of	so-called	genital	ambiguity.	3	It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 “viscus”,	 which	 may	 be	 circumscribed	 in	several	ways,	seems	somewhat	unclear,	even	though	its	purpose	seems,	in	equal	measure,	rather	unquestionable,	thus	approaching	the	idea	of	“word”.	See	Di	Dio	(1948,	pp.	187–198)	and	Benveniste	(1964/1971,	pp.	101-111).	




After all, if, on one hand, the historical preexistence of the biological body in relation 
to language might lead to the belief that it was precisely the emergence of languages 
that enabled several of them to name themselves as such, in the same way they had 
previously named the organ; on the other, we are confronted with a circularity as soon 
as we notice that nothing can be named before there is a language that makes it 
possible to name anything. Thus, even though we may assume that every name 
emerged as a proper noun—or, in accordance with the tradition in Arabic grammar, 
literally a “flag-noun”: علم  إسم  (ism ‘alam)—the very act of naming carries within 
itself an impropriety. After all, in the field of deixis, a pure act of indication, we find a 
gesture pointing to an object that, if anything, allows itself to be indicated, but recedes 
at the slightest attempt at touching and completely circumscribing it, expropriating 
itself, so that the object has forever been lost. This means, at the very least, 
guaranteeing that there is no Other of the tongue, because the very tongue is always 
Other, even the m(O)ther tongue; and that the syntagm “foreign tongue”, for instance, 
is pleonastic, once that every tongue is heterogeneous/extraneous/foreign to what 
becomes a name within it. That said, every tongue is, as a matter of principle, an 
impropriety and, in the extended sense of the term, a constellation of catachreses: as 
Quintilian used to say (Institutio Oratoria, 8.6.35), when something bears no name 
and the name of something that is perceived as similar is extended to it, i.e., when one 
commits an abusio by generalizing a designation, by situating it within a generic 
constellation. However, when defining abusio, the grammarian also says that the 
deviant use ought to be differentiated from the usage of a name that exists in place of 
another which also exists: in this case, it would be within the realm of translatio, 
which the Greek language referred to as μεταφορά (metaforá): transportation and—
why not?—transference. Therefore, if the tongue institutes itself in the abuse (from 
nothing to name), it is put into practice in translation (from one name to the other): a 
practice in speech and writing, but also a practice in listening and reading.  
 
Here, when we say tongue, we are talking about this tongue that preceded us, which is 
in constant change, and was transferred to us from others, which, in turn, received it 
from other others. A tongue which we were invested with, which gave us a voice and 
taught us, by force, to invest the body at our disposal in a particular way, providing us 
with the opportunity to inhabit it, as it has been loaded with the gestures of speech 
and with the borders they draw (with the senses and nonsenses they single out)4. A 
tongue that corrupts the objects and that, whilst spoken, speaks us: just one slip of the 
tongue is enough and no sooner said than done (it tells on us and there is no tongue-
in-cheek). But also a sharp tongue that profanes itself (in the infamy of mistakes, in 
the prestige of poetry) and breaks the silence it soon learns to violate. Likewise, the 
tongue has also been acknowledged as the very object of retaliation for transgressions 
which some were, for some reason, trying to silence. For instance, during the 16th 
century Reformation, within the context of torture methods aimed at silencing women 
in particular: executioners “prepared two little irons between which the tongue was 
screwed, which being seared at the tip with a glowing iron, would swell to such a 
degree, as to become immoveable, and incapable of being drawn back” (Brandt, 
1671/1720, p. 275). Or as in Germany, Spain and Italy, where there were accounts of 
 4	“Evolution	has	made	of	us	 the	only	primates	capable	of	hearing	gestures	 that	may,	in	a	variety	of	ways,	point	to	other	gestures,	inaudible	but	full	of	meaning”	(Albano,	2001,	p.	179).




a practice that punished offenders by piercing their tongues with a fiery iron rod 
(Portal, 1770, pp. 310–311). 
 
Between attempts at dialogue and attacks which, at all times in history, sought to 
create an obstacle to communication (more or less literally), it seems that the body of 
the tongue has frequently been an object of attention. If intercourse is precisely a term 
that carries within itself both senses of communication and sexual relations, maybe it 
is not a coincidence that, in many cultures, the presence of tongues in the act of 
kissing is so prevalent; or the power, on the order of separation, of a tongue stretched 
out of the mouth, solitary and exhibited to others, constituting a sign of mockery (for 
the adult) or a serious offense (for the child). And with the notion of intercourse we 
once again find the translatio mentioned by Quintilian: the metaphorical translation, 
the copulation between the terms of that which aspires to be a relationship or, so to 
speak, a counterpoint (as in music, when a melody is added as accompaniment to 
another). If every tongue, as a constellation of catachreses, is founded in abuse, it is 
practiced during intercourse. Thus, it is during dialogue that the other’s tongue is 
transformed into our own, transforming ourselves in the process, therein marking not 
only a discrepancy between one and oneself (after all, the speaker may see themself, 
beyond the mirror, as a third person), but also placing the human, which is subject to 
that, within constellations of possible similarities with other elements, which were 
named and grouped in advance according to the presence or absence of characters 
that were given meaning throughout history, and through which they are read, 
immediately at times. At the time of birth—or, due to technical advances, even before 
that—the subject to be, endowed with their characters, is, first and foremost, a subject 
to be read; and, at first, nothing can be done to counter this reading. Let us call these 
letter constellations, based on which the subject is read and positioned, genders. 
 
“Genders” in plural, since they are many. From a broader viewpoint, grouped within 
the constellation of those who speak, for instance, we (of the human gender) see 
ourselves as capable of creating the world in the image of our likenesses. If the 
catachresis, a deviant use, will be in charge of naming in an extensive way, it is not 
surprising that the generalization one’s own body will find a breeding ground therein: 
on the “head of a nail” or at the “foot of the page”, it is the human body that, whilst 
fragmented, finds a direction through which to extend itself5. And thus, the genders 
also extend to words. However, Brazilian Portuguese speakers should not naturalize 
that grammatical genders may get mixed up with the masculine and the feminine, 
though they invariably do and though they are in fact capable of infesting the 
imaginary of any given speaker (Jakobson, 1959, pp. 232–239; Lakoff, 1987). There 
is no need to have a certain interest towards, for example, German (in which “miss”, 
Fräulein, is gender-neutral) or Russian (in which “man”, мужчина [muzhchína], 
despite being a masculine noun, is morphologically constituted as well as declined 
according to the paradigm of the feminine) in order to reflect upon the fact that bolso 
(“pocket” in Portuguese) is not exactly more masculine than bolsa (“handbag” in 
Portuguese). The examples here are numerous. Nevertheless, we should not even 
naturalize the notion of grammatical gender as being attached to the classical 
bipartition between masculine and feminine, as demonstrated not only by German and 
 5	An	example	of	this	is	the	个	(gè)	in	Mandarin	Chinese,	which	is	mainly	used	in	reference	 to	 people	 and	 easily	 replicated	 to	 words	 of	 different	 genders,	especially	in	informal	situations.	




Russian (with their neuter genders) or Romanian (with its neuter, which is a peculiar 
mixture between masculine and feminine), but also Chinese and several indigenous 
languages of the Americas, in which genders are frequently grouped around 
characteristics such as form and function. 
 
What is at stake, then, in dealing with this anatomy of the tongue is that these 
elements, available within the body and the language, boiling over in the cauldron of 
history, eventually sink in different severing possibilities and, of course, prompt the 
imaginary. However, from the moment they take on a meaning, leaving the pure 
empire of catachreses and migrating to the world of metaphors, to interpret them as 
destiny (term, end, target) hangs on how we distinguish the subject’s function as that 
which is read or which, at times, makes itself capable of writing: as one who 
punctuates that which is written about oneself. Thus, towards their bodies and their 
characters, as well as towards the act of writing (the writing itself regarded precisely 
as a set of characters), there are at least two possible exemplary attitudes. The first 
one, so to speak, would be falling into the so-called Arabian fatalism, the legendary 
مكتوب  (maktub, “it’s written”), or even, with regard to characters, wanting to be not 
only normative but also universalistic: Leibniz’s characteristica universalis, for 
instance. In this sense, it is a well-known fact that Didot, an embodiment of the 19th 
century typographic thinking, punctuated in the same way every text that fell under 
his responsibility, as if resuming Beauzée’s conclusion on the entry “Punctuation” in 
Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopedia: “it would be desirable that, in whatever 
language the books printed today were written, editors introduced the system of 
punctuation used in all living languages in Europe” (Beauzée, 1765, p. 24). 
 
In April 1876, proceeding in that direction, in the 137th edition of L’Imprimerie, a 
French magazine devoted to typography and lithography, the editorial declared that 
“punctuation is the anatomy of language and thought” and that “to punctuate is to 
dissect the phrases”. Based on logic, punctuation would thus be universal: valid, 
therefore “for languages of all times and all countries, applied, without any 
distinction, to Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, English, German and French” 
(Lorenceau, 1980, p. 52). 
 
The typographers [who wrote the aforementioned editorial] may certainly aim at 
the figurative sense, and thus we think of what the school tradition called the 
“logical analysis” of the sentence; but, above all, we think of the autopsy, the 
anatomy plates, these representations of the écorchés, which reveal the inner 
structure of a body—of a dead body. (Serça, 2015, pp. 173–184) 
 
We are definitely not talking about dead bodies here; in the same way this is about 
living tongues. And if according to Whitehead—author, along with Russell, of the 
renowned Principia mathematica—“life lurks in the interstices” (Whitehead, 
1929/1978, p. 105), it is to be expected for Sand to say, sparking off a hostile reaction 




from typographers of that time, that “a correct distribution of stops requires tact”, 
which “are not within the province of the proof-reader” (Sand, 1871/1873, p. 96). 
George Sand, the enigmatic pseudonym of Amantine-Lucile-Aurore Dupin (Sand, 
1856, p. 45), argues for the possibility, within the ambit of characters, of a 
punctuation—thus, of an anatomy of the language, according to typographers—that is 
in line with fantasy and tact, open to the desire of the one who writes and that, like 
her, wishes to be read; wishes to be read in a certain way. And what her very own 
public presentation as cross-dresser was capable of pointing out, during the first half 
of the 19th century, was that the experience with one’s own body and with the body of 
the other, in the level of their various characters, is culturally punctuated (so that the 
body, like the text, may be presented with distinct punctuations in different 
civilizations, tongues and eras) but is also punctuable: in the most diverse senses of 
the term, Sand, regarded as the first woman who lived off her own royalties, made 
herself read in the masculine (Sand, 1856, p. 5). Once the elements are given in the 
condition of a mark, they still do not find themselves hindered from being punctuated 
according to the likes of the speaker’s fantasies, who includes points that are capable 
of supporting their desire and, thus, throwing the dice for, on contingency, opening 
themselves up to the possibility of encounters and altercations: the so-called 
intercourses between bodies, always im-probable, in the sense that they cannot be 
proved6. The composer Frédéric Chopin, for example, maintained a relationship with 
George Sand for almost his entire stay in Paris, creating a “musical-literary, political 
and gender counterpoint” (Wisnik, 2013, p. 19). 
 
Finally, the intercourses present one dimension of the politics of traces, of characters 
which, with the aid of psychoanalysis, may be thought of as a poli-tíkhē: politics as 
the management of multiple chance events, each with their own destiny (τύχη), which 
translates from Greek to German as Schicksal. Not by chance, the Napoleonic 
statement that “politics is destiny” is precisely what Freud claims to be paraphrasing 
when making the notorious assertion that “anatomy is destiny” [die Anatomie ist das 
Schicksal], a formulation that appears in writing in two moments of his work: “On the 
Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love” (Freud, 1912/1970, p. 
209) and “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” (Freud, 1924/1970, p. 249). The 
context for that statement borrowed by Freud seems to be paramount however (Moi, 
2001, pp. 374–377). 
 
The year is 1898; more precisely, September. Napoleon and Goethe meet in Weimar. 
The subject: theater; more precisely, the gothic melodramas, which were popular by 
the end of the 18th century, the so-called “destiny plays (Schicksalsstücke)” (Goethe, 
1808/1952), p. 1416). According to Goethe’s notes on that conversation, Napoleon 
completely disapproves of this kind of play, since they supposedly belonged to dark 
times: “What does one want destiny for now?”, he asks, following with: “Politics is 
destiny”. “Destiny”, what an uncomfortable term! Whether in the gothic melodrama 
or the classical tragedy, I would like here to raise the question: would it not be better, 
in order to set up a discussion about anatomy starting from the psychoanalytical 
experience—i.e., from a certain experience with language—to think of another term 
to translate Freud who translated Goethe who translated Napoleon who, as history 
 6	Note:	according	to	Lacan	(2011),	the	sexual	act	does	not	exist	precisely	because	it	cannot	be	written.	




shows, did not translate anyone who did not recognize the imperious insignia on his 
uniform? 
 
If Freud says that the goal/intention/purpose of life is death by using the term Ziel 
(Freud, 1920/1975, p. 248), why not think about Schicksal, through which echoes the 
verb schicken (to send), not so much like destiny or end, but as the fate that is devised 
along the way. Or, better yet, as they say in the theater, the denouement that, taken 
literally, is precisely the opposite of a closure? Therefore, even delving into the 
origins did not freeze Freud in the past, since he was capable of foreseeing, in the 
myth and the primeval, the possibility of thinking the present of the clinic to which he 
dedicated himself and the theory underpinned by it. As psychoanalysts, would it not 
be precisely the opportunity we present: that in building an analytical path the 
transference investment might be capable of connecting the fragments of that which is 
primary with a future that, from then on, is rebuilt? Therefore, the clinic would be 
nothing less than an investment in possible recombinations within the original 
experience on behalf of a subject development that is less stagnant in the midst of 
their circumstances, through building the ability to deal with one’s own marks and 
acting on them. 
 
Characters, marks, insignia: limits with which we must cope, but also emblems 
capable of sending, communicating, remitting to the other the history of those who 
create and, with more or less pride, carry them. In the body of the text or the text of 
the body that is written in order to be read therefore lies the compulsoriness of an act 
of addressing, of sending, which is articulated with contingencies of style and of all 
that is made possible by techniques and artifices. A style that, as an incision, also 
lurks in interstices, just like life; a style that, although may seem to be resisting 
alterity, is constituted by it. We shall remember, after all, that Lotman (1996/1999, p. 
58) defines the trope (the figure of speech, the figure of style) as “a mechanism for 
constructing a content which could not be constructed by one language alone” since it 
is “a figure born at the point of contact between two languages”; and Lacan (1960-
61/1991, p. 372) connects the idea of trope to the idea of destiny by saying that 
destiny “is the trope par excellence, the trope of tropes”. And if Lacan, while 
translating Buffon for an audience that was his own, said that “style is the man to 
whom one addresses oneself” (Lacan, 1966, p. 9), a hundred years before Sand 
anticipated an adage that would still take a while for Freud, then a teenager, to 
eventually understand and which not even Lacan, to the best of my knowledge, has 
ever commented on: “punctuation is much more the man than style is” (Sand, 
1871/1873, p. 920). There is an adage we might gain from bringing back; us, who 
have translated Lacan who translated Buffon, but still face a bit of challenge—we 
must admit—in translating George Sand and many others who, with their brave 
truths, dared to translate themselves through the course of their own histories. 
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